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Ellen Holmes Pearson, Remaking Custom: Law and Identity in the Early American
Republic. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011, pp. 251, $42.50.
Reviewed by Steven J. Macias
Ellen Holmes Pearson makes the case that early republican legal scholars—
those writing to circa 1830—were central to defining national identity and to
creating an American culture. In a sense, these scholars, whom Pearson terms
“legists,” were the progenitors of the modern-day law professor. Remaking
Custom, therefore, should be of interest to all those concerned not only with
the history of legal scholars but also with these legists’ potential for actively
shaping the legal system. Pearson’s work is perhaps even more important at a
time when the value of professors’ legal scholarship is so hostilely questioned
by the bench, bar and public more generally.
Remaking Custom appears in the University of Virginia Press’s series,
Jeffersonian America—a series that should be better known among legal
scholars. Catherine Allgor’s Parlor Politics,1 Marshall Foletta’s Coming to Terms with
Democracy,2 and Jeffrey Pasley’s “The Tyranny of Printers”3 are just a few of the titles
that have significance to many of the legal and constitutional events that took
place in the early republic and that can still shed light on modern concerns.
Pearson’s work can now be added to that list as she writes “about the ways the
United States’ first generation of legal scholars used their lectures and writings
to explain American law and its history and character” (1).
Pearson’s work might seem more a study in contrasts than comparisons
with modern legal academia. The legists who form the bulk of Pearson’s
study “combined the disciplines of history, law, and politics in their lectures
so that they could articulate to their students the origins and evolution of the
common law within their states and their nation” (16). In stark contrast, David
Segal’s recent New York Times articles have criticized law schools as emphasizing
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the “theoretical over the useful.”4 The author proves his point by faulting law
schools for teaching topics ranging from “the variety of property law in postfeudal England” to “postmodern legal theory,” with citation to Chief Justice
John Roberts’ recent objection to a hypothetical article about “the influence of
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th century Bulgaria”—which
“isn’t of much help to the practicing bar”—thrown in for good measure.5
Segal himself could have benefitted from Pearson’s work, in which case he
would not have made a gross, but unfortunately common, error about the
origins of legal education in early America. Segal contends that a “tradeschool anxiety can be traced back to the mid-19th century, when legal training
was mostly technical and often in rented rooms that were unattached to
institutions of higher education.”6 But the mid-19th century is far too late
to begin a discussion of trade-school anxiety. It is also misleading in that it
neglects the institutionalized legal education that was already established in
the first three decades of the century. If the mid-19th century is notable for
anything related to legal education, it is the decline in scholarly focus of the
previous decades. As Pearson explains, as early as the 1820s scholars criticized
the rising generation of lawyers “for being lazy and poorly read, and lawyers
trained in the old methods feared that the fast-track legal education that the
younger set demanded would turn their profession into nothing more than a
trade” (176).
Pearson ends her discussion of first-generation legal scholars with the
publication of James Kent’s four-volume Commentaries on American Law, which
originally appeared between 1826 and 1830. This is “a logical place to end”
because “with this comprehensive American treatise, the nation’s legal
culture seemed to have emerged from England’s shadow” (7). The first two
chapters give a sense of how Pearson conceives the Americanization of both
the common law and constitutional and political principles. The next three
chapters focus on how legists affected and explained discrete areas of law, in
particular, the law of property acquisition and inheritance, slavery, and the
treatment of Indians through public land law. The final substantive chapter
focuses on the content and purposes of the newly emerging native legal
treatises. The common themes that bind these chapters include the rise of
the American preference for consent and choice over and above the English
preference for custom, as well as the conscious effort to distinguish American
law and political institutions from English precedent.
Pearson’s source selection is quite interesting in that she primarily uses
published material from names that have slipped from the collective memory
of modern legal academia. James Kent, St. George Tucker, Tapping Reeve,
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Zephaniah Swift, Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Peter Du Ponceau, Nathaniel
Chipman, and David Hoffman form the core of Pearson’s informants. Tucker,
the first American to edit and annotate a native edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries in 1803, was also the second professor of law and police at William
and Mary, in addition to being a state judge. Reeve, founder of the famous
Litchfield Law School, the most important proprietary law school in the early
republic, also authored the first major American treatise on domestic relations
law. Swift was a state court judge and author of the first comprehensive
treatment of American law, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut in 1795.
Brackenridge, also a state court judge, authored Law Miscellanies, a single volume
collecting and annotating those parts of Blackstone relevant to Pennsylvania.
Du Ponceau was founder of the Legal Academy of Philadelphia and author of
the first monograph on federal court jurisdiction in 1824. Chipman, a Vermont
Supreme Court justice, composed an early work on political and legal thought,
Principles of Government. Finally, Hoffman, who receives the least amount of
attention from Pearson, was by far the most innovative early legal educator,
being the first law professor at the University of Maryland and publishing
numerous law lectures and his six-year reading list, A Course of Legal Study in
1817. As Pearson shows, the body of work produced by these legists is rich and
underappreciated by legal scholars and historians of all stripes. These men
form the center of Pearson’s work “because they incorporated something of
their society’s history and character into their law books” (6).
Common Law, Constitutions, and Character
Pearson’s first two substantive chapters explain the Americanization of
the common law and constitutionalism, and in particular, how a burgeoning
American character informed each of those subjects. When Americans spoke
of the “common law” in the early republic, they frequently had wider “political
and cultural purposes” than to simply refer to a body of rules (29). Instead,
the “common law” referred to a legal culture that historically had valued
precedent and custom over and above Enlightenment-style rationality. The
Americans, however, “reframed the meaning of custom in a common-law
culture by adding elements of consent and choice” (12). The combination of
“custom” and “choice” allowed James Wilson to praise the common law for
its flexibility in adapting to the needs of the new nation (25). Pearson builds
on earlier work that explained Wilson’s views on common law and consent
as responses to Blackstone’s views on sovereignty, including his conclusion
that the common law was inapplicable in the American colonies.7 In claiming
that the common law did not apply to the conquered lands that formed the
colonies because Parliament had never formally acted to do so, Blackstone
sounded a note of American inferiority that would continue to echo in the ears
7.
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of early Americans, especially the elites who resented the cultural supremacy
of England and Europe.
The process of Americanization helped “to diminish lingering feelings of
cultural dependence on England” (22). The theme of cultural inferiority is a
prominent one in the historiography of the early republic,8 and Pearson’s work
goes a long way in explaining how the legists’ prime motivation in their legal
scholarship was to overcome those national self doubts. In the realm of the
common law this means that consent and choice overtook custom or, as one
historian has put it, Americans began to prefer “reason over precedents.”9 In
the realm of constitution making, especially at the state level, the concepts of
custom and choice became even more tangible.10
Although the states varied a great deal in their constitutional goals
and provisions, some common themes help to make sense of American
constitutionalism as a concept. Even though voting qualifications were still
tied to property ownership, suffrage generally expanded under the belief
that more equitable representation was more in keeping with the science of
government. Binding representatives to constituents’ wishes was rejected,
but legislatures were still thought to be the best security for the people as
against the executive. That security was itself increased with open government
provisions, checks and balances, and the lack of any privileged position of
service comparable to the British House of Lords. In the judicial province,
there was more disagreement as to what constituted an independent judiciary;
nevertheless, Pearson makes several observations in this regard. Courts
of chancery generally played a minor role in state judiciaries because the
American conception of equity pervaded the common law itself. Precedent was
slightly less important than in England, and the juries served as “alternative
representative bodies, as additional symbols of popular sovereignty, and as
powerful checks on the actions of judges” (67).
These constitutional commonalities, as well as the shift in common-law
thinking, were all conscious attempts to distinguish the American system of
law and government from its British forebear. It is certainly not Pearson’s claim
that the legists themselves were responsible for these changes in constitutional
and legal thought. Instead, Pearson’s point is that the legists viewed their job
as selling the American improvements in law, first to their students, then to
the cross-Atlantic legal community. “It was up to the law educator to show the
8.
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next generation of practitioners where Americans had improved upon their
English legal inheritance and to help shape legal and social institutions that
would enhance the American character” (10).
Legists in Action: Property, Slavery, and Westward Expansion
The second part of Pearson’s book (even though not divided as such)
contains three chapters on private property, slavery, and public lands. This
is an interesting division of topics in which to explore the legists’ ideas about
American law because, with the exception of property and inheritance rights,
it is far from clear that these topics were of paramount concern to the men who
form Pearson’s source material. That is not to say that they did not discuss
slavery, westward expansion and American Indians. However, it is not always
clear that any uniquely legal outlook informed their thoughts on these subjects.
One suspects that these categories are ways for Pearson to give race and, to a
lesser extent, gender a prominent role in her historical narrative. Regardless,
the topics ultimately work well to demonstrate how the legists went about
explaining and justifying the unique features of American law as the result of
moral and cultural improvements.
One of the earliest 20th century histories of the American Revolution
emphasized the uniform shift in land laws: “Democratic land-tenure was the
natural thing in a new country like America, and made its way at once when
political revolution loosened the ties of old habit.”11 Progressive historian J.
Franklin Jameson explained that the post-revolutionary elimination of entails
and primogeniture in the states had a “common cause,” namely a “social
revolution” rather than a strictly political or legal revolution. Pearson likewise
emphasizes the changes in land tenure, but additionally she discusses those
groups that did not necessarily fare so well in this democratic revolution.
Because land law changes did not benefit all groups equally, Pearson’s
explanation necessarily rejects Jameson’s democratic explanation. Instead,
Pearson emphasizes the moral and republican justifications for the changes
in land law. The legists explained the changes in law as the result of a new
recognition that real property was “a moral tool by emphasizing the idea that
private possessions should be used to the best advantage of the community”
(83).
The legists reiterated that the elimination of primogeniture and entails, as
well as English forfeiture and escheat rules, proved the moral advancement
of American law over the English common law. Chancellor Kent suggested
Roman law, with its reflection of “the universal law of civilized society,” as a
basis of reform (83). This led Kent to further suggest that the law of descent
was rooted in natural law, contrary to Blackstone’s purely positivistic, but
irrational, understanding (92). Brackenridge emphasized that broader
property distribution would increase public utility (99). “Tucker cast
American notions of rational choice as superior to English impulses to follow
11.
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tradition unthinkingly” (90). In making the case against primogeniture,
Tucker employed the power of reason to explain that the firstborn son did not
necessarily inherit either virtue or talent.
But, as Pearson tells us, “America’s progressive inheritance laws only went
so far” (101). “While free white males benefited from the Americanization of
property ownership and inheritance law, women gained little ground” (111).
“Legal scholars,” according to Pearson, “were among the first to wrestle
with the moral and historical questions about the nature and evolution
of American slavery” (114). Perhaps one of the most curious features of the
legists’ writings is how the vast majority, whether northern or southern, agreed
upon the non-natural-law nature of slavery, and thus its immorality. Both St.
George Tucker of Virginia and James Kent of New York blamed England for
introducing slavery into America. Tucker even conceived an entire plan for
the gradual elimination of slavery and reprinted it in his edition of Blackstone
in 1803. Another, Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut, “employed the strategy of
elevating his own nation’s reputation by deflating England’s character” (129).
At the Litchfield Law School, Reeve and Gould disagreed over how to teach
slavery. The older Reeve taught that slavery was illegal in Connecticut because
it was against natural law. By contrast, the younger Gould, although morally
opposed to it, taught that slavery was legal because it was countenanced by
positive law (120).
Although Pearson concludes that the legists’ anti-slavery sentiments were
genuine, she nevertheless contends that they did not always explain the law
of slavery in a straightforward manner. In other words, blaming England and
claiming illegality via natural law were both means of whitewashing the issue.
Legists like Tucker and Reeve “could manipulate their perception of the law
to accommodate their own social opinions about the place of slavery in their
states, but the reality of the law did not always correspond to their perceptions”
(139). In their constant attempts to raise the cultural and moral status of their
nation through its laws, the legists tended to paint a rosier picture of the state
of slavery in America.12
As with slavery, Native American Indians presented a novel challenge for
the legal system; “No English precedent existed for such a situation” (142).
Pearson believes that the legal justifications offered for the treatment of Indians
“provide a glimpse into Anglo-Americans’ sense of entitlement to territory and
empire” (142). Unlike the problem of slavery, the Americans could not blame
the English for introducing the Indians onto the land in the first instance.
Hence, the “legists struggled with the challenge of making this part of the
American character a positive attribute” (143). Moreover, whereas many legal
scholars had seen slavery in action, “with a few notable exceptions,” they were
“detached from the frontier struggles between Indians and white settlers”
(146). The legists’ basic tack was to use “natural law concepts of discovery and
12.
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occupancy and the notion of consent to justify appropriation of Indian lands”
(149).
Because the legists “considered themselves teachers of much more than
the law, they expended considerable energy defending their nation’s right to
territory” (145–46). Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a frontiersman who lived in
Pittsburgh, used Vattel’s Law of Nations to turn questions of property rights into
questions of public utility—“what was best for the largest number of people”
(149). Brackenridge, besides being a legist and justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, was also a famous novelist in his time and thus wrote for
several different audiences.13 When writing about Indians for a broader
audience, he used “more emotional language” to paint a “savage image”
of Indian land claimants (161). However, when writing for an audience of
lawyers, Brackenridge used the language of rationality and utility-based
calculations. “He wrote that the land should be used in a way that would
sustain the greatest number of people and provide ‘the greatest sum happiness;
that is, the cultivation of the soil’” (163). Kent likewise followed utilitarian
reasoning in his judicial opinions on the matter (149–50). Even though Kent
was sympathetic to the Indians’ plight, he described their disappearance as
inevitable, which “helped give the next generation of legal practitioners the
intellectual tools to participate in, and justify, imperial expansion” (171).
Legal Scholarship
The legal scholarship produced in the early republic had one basic goal: to
highlight the distinctions between the American and English legal systems,
glorifying the former, showing the failings of the latter (175). The legists largely
accomplished this goal by claiming that Americans, unlike the English, treated
law as a science and thus were in a better position to advance their nation,
both morally and culturally, through law. The treatises were “part of the move
toward professionalization in the law, the drive for a more scientific study of
the law, and agitation for Americanization of the law through codification”
(178).
Kent’s work embodies the fruition of the American “remaking of custom.”
Although his work was fundamentally a defense of the common law, he
demonstrated respect for European civil law and recognized that Americans
could benefit from it. Kent also emphasized the importance of universality
and natural justice over the English preference for immemorial custom. The
Roman law was useful in fulfilling that emphasis as well. Kent, along with
others, recognized the increased importance of commercial subjects and, yet
again, the universal principles of justice associated with Roman law helped
in developing a commercial jurisprudence for America. Finally, Kent, like
other early republican legists, strove to develop new federal precedents while
balancing existing state precedents.
13.
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Pearson closes with the example of Tucker’s son, Henry St. George Tucker,
also a legal scholar, but a far more conservative, states rights lawyer. His
treatises focused more on state law than federal law, but he followed Kent’s
lead in the Americanization process (187–91). According to Pearson, this is
“a telling illustration of the shift in mentality from the custom-oriented,
unwritten-law society of Henry St. George Tucker’s father to a society that
saw considerable merit in statute law” (191).
Modern-Day Legists
Whether a group of modern-day legists exists, or should exist, is an
interesting question, which, if the blogs are representative, seems to occupy
the time of law professors. Remaking Custom can usefully shed light on this
question by adding some historical perspective to the discussion. As Pearson
explained, the legists were a group of legal scholars—writers and teachers—
who attempted to teach “much more than the law.” They wanted to shape the
character of the profession by first shaping the character of students. This,
in turn, would result in a legal profession that would prove a benefit to the
nation, both locally and internationally. Whereas Europe set the standards
in literature, art, and philosophy, America would set the standard in law.
Having examined many of Pearson’s primary sources for my own work, I
am certain that she has accurately characterized the legists’ motives and the
means through which they attempted to achieve them. The writings of the
legal elites show, even more than Pearson discusses, an overarching concern
with morality. This certainly comes through when she writes about inheritance
law, slavery, and the taking of Indian property, but the concern with justifying
every legal rule in moral terms permeated far deeper than these obviously
morally charged topics. The very method of legal reasoning worried these
legists because the new Enlightenment interest in science undermined their
epistemological foundations. As Pearson hints, many of them found a new
morality in universal notions of justice located in natural and Roman law.
Moreover, they found that turn-of-the-century rationality and utility provided
the means by which the law could attain just solutions to complicated social
problems.
By contrast, it seems that no working law professor actually believes
that the fate of the nation rests in his and his fellow professors’ hands. The
social, cultural, political, and demographic changes that always restrict the
usefulness of the historical analogy seem especially relevant here. But perhaps
we can narrow the question and ask whether modern law professors share the
same concern with the relationship between legal reasoning and morality and
justice. In other words, do modern law professors share the legists’ preference
for reason over precedent? Do they share the concerns of early republican law
professor, Jesse Bledsoe of Kentucky?
One great reason, among others, why there are so few eminent lawyers, is, that
they are too apt to learn law, as a parrot does language: by rote. Cases, are read
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with a view, to their particular circumstances only; while the principles upon
which the decision is based, are overlooked or not understood. A mere case
lawyer, can never be a great one.14

Many other legists echoed Bledsoe’s sentiments in the early republic,
stressing the point that law was not simply a trade that was to be learned by
imitation of a master craftsman. One of Bledsoe’s successors at Transylvania
University, Daniel Mayes, was especially critical of “mere case lawyers.” Mayes
asked, “How often have the ablest ministers of justice been compelled to
smother the cries of conscience, and sacrifice the rights of a party upon the
altar of the idol, stare decisis!”15 He further criticized the existing method of
training lawyers: “Wholly unable to assign a reason for anything they do, but
acting as the preceptor acted before them, because he so acted, they acquire
the art, whilst wholly ignorant of the science of jurisprudence.”16
Stanley Fish frames the current debate in legal education in a similar
fashion: “whether principle or history should inform a court’s decision.”17 In
his course on religion and law, Fish teaches the works of philosophers Berlin,
Locke, Rawls, Hobbes, Kant, Unger, and Rorty. Even though he recognizes
that his students will not likely be citing those names in a legal brief, Fish
nevertheless justifies his pedagogy by explaining that “the practice of law is
more than a technical/strategic exercise in which doctrines, precedents, rules
and tests are marshaled in the service of a client’s cause.”18 Moreover, to those
who might claim that a student’s time is better spent learning how to draft
a brief or write a contract, that is, learning the tricks of the trade, instead of
reading Rorty, Fish retorts, “learning the tricks of the trade would not amount
to much and might well be impossible for someone who did not know—in a
deep sense of know—what the trade is and why it is important to practice it.”
Lamenting the decline of the liberal arts in the face of the current emphasis
on “practical short-term payoffs,” Fish wonders whether law will be the next
victim of this shortsighted focus: “The law is surely a practice but it is also a
14.
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subject, and if it ceases to be a subject—ceases to be an object of analysis in
classrooms and in law reviews—its practice will be diminished.”19
Fish comes closest to echoing the words of the early republican legists.
Their greatest fear was, if the law remained a mere trade whose ranks were
filled with unlearned pettifoggers, then the study of the subject would never
be a respectable one. Because the law dealt with topics as fundamental as
domestic and international peace and justice, it was too important a subject
to go unstudied. If those trained in the law were not going to reflect on it in a
systematic manner, then who was, asked the legists.
The nation’s first professors of law were well aware that they were going
against the grain—promoting liberal studies in the face of a profession that
did not always see the usefulness of formal education. In a sense, the tension
between the legal academy and the practicing bar has never faded. In April
2010, the president of the State Bar of California decried “the embarrassing
disconnect between legal education and law practice.”20 But the substance of
his complaint is not new. What is new is that the modern legal academy has
not defended itself with the vigor of the original American legal professoriate.
For better or worse, there are no modern-day Simon Greenleafs, moralizing
to state bar presidents that clients don’t always know what is best for
themselves.21 Nor are there any Professor Thomas Coopers, explaining that
the “practical skills of lawyering and representing clients”22 are merely the
traits of a tradesman, not the deep learning of the scientist.23 But perhaps the
social worth of tradesmen has been undervalued throughout the history of
legal education, and likewise the professional worth of “legal scientists” by
the practicing bar. Remaking Custom allows us to consider the benefits and the
drawbacks of such an active and forceful set of legal intellectuals at a crucial
point in American history.
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